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The 'Mandatory' Nature of the Hague
Service Convention in the United States
is the Forum's Victory
ABSTRACT

This Note addresses the current United States approach to the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. The Note recognizes a split in
United States case law concerning whether strict compliance with the
Hague Service Convention is required. While some United States courts
focus on the scope of the Convention and United States due process concepts to avoid strict compliance, other courts, especially state courts, require strict compliance with the Convention under the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution. The authorfocuses on service on foreign state corporations by substituted service on United States domestic
subsidiariesas agents offoreign corporations.
The Note presents the United States Supreme Court's answer to the
split in the case law in favor of the interpretation requiring mandatory
application of the Hague Service Convention. The author considers the
effect of this interpretation on a second split in United States case law
concerningwhether the Convention allows service by mail. Based on this
and other effects of the Supreme Court's solution, the author concludes
that this ostensible answerfalls short of affording the Convention true
supremacy. The Courtfalters by focusing solely on its interpretation of
the scope of the Convention and by failing to look at all the purposes of
the Convention, which the author argues is the better reasoned approach.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The rise of international civil litigation-a response to the ever-increasing interdependence of national economies-generates much concern over the mechanics of such litigation.' International service of process is an obviously important issue in this litigation, but it remains a
much disputed area of conflict between states. The Hague Convention on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention or Convention)2 represents an attempt by a number of states, including the United States and
most industrial Western states,' to lessen this dispute. At least from the
United States perspective, however, two main issues arise in the case law
concerning the Hague Service Convention and cause disagreement in the
1. See, e.g., Jones, InternationalJudicialAssistance: ProceduralChaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 516-17 (1953).
2. The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, openedfor signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force Feb. 10, 1969) [hereinafter Hague Service Convention]. The full text of the Convention is reproduced below. See
infra appendix.
3. See generally Note, International Service of Process: Reconciling the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedurewith the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad ofJudicial
and Extrajudidal Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1071 (1988).
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lower federal and state courts. The first issue is whether the Convention
controls international service of process to the exclusion of the United
States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and domestic state long arm
statutes. The second issue is whether the Convention allows the mailing
of service of process abroad directly to the opposing party or only the
sending of judicial documents by the mails.
This Note examines the historical splits in the case law concerning
these two issues. It shows that while there was general agreement that
the Hague Service Convention supersedes state laws, a split existed in
regard to the relative authority of the Convention and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, as well as to whether the Convention allows service
of process by mail. This Note then discusses how recent United States
Supreme Court cases, which apparently close the gap in the first split of
cases in favor of the supremacy of the Convention over the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure possibly may open the previously agreed, yet related,
gap regarding the relationship between the Convention and state service
rules. This Note considers the ramifications of this development on future interpretations of the applicability of the Hague Service Convention,
and focuses on the effect of the Court's pronouncements on the second
split in the case law regarding service of process by mail. This Note
concludes that the best way to determine the applicability of the Hague
Service Convention is a case by case analysis that includes consideration
of all the Convention's purposes and a presumption in favor of the applicability of the Convention. This method simultaneously gives courts a
necessary flexibility in extreme cases and upholds the integrity of the
Convention.
A.

The Hague Service Convention

The Hague Service Convention reached its final form on 15 November 1965- as a result of discussions between twenty-three states, including the United States.5 Today, twenty-eight states are party to the Convention.6 The Convention arose from a milieu of growing concern over

4. Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, preamble; see Note, The Hague Service
Convention and Agency Concepts: Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 20
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 391, 395 (1987).
5. Note, supra note 4, at 395; see also Note, The Effect of the Hague Convention on
Service Abroad ofJudicialand ExtrajudicialDocuments in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125, 126 (1969).

6. 1989

TREATIES IN FORCE

328 (U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 9433). The member

states are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Greece,
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the shortcomings of and challenges to international judicial service of
process.1 In this connection, reference is frequently made to the following: (1) the United States post-World War II judicial isolationism at a
time when the dislocation of persons and property and the emergence of
the United States as the world's leading industrial and creditor state generated an "unprecedented volume of litigation involving international
complications;"8 (2) the reciprocal inadequacy of judicial assistance between states;9 (3) the need for personal service at a time when neither
publications nor the files of the State Department of the United States
contained information on how to secure service or described the attitudes
or practices of foreign governments; ° (4) the fact that foreign counsel
fees for guidance on service were in excess of the amounts usually allowed by United States courts for costs of service; 1 (5) the absolute bar
to using consular officers to execute service;12 (6) the problems in meeting United States practice act requirements when complying with foreign
service law;18 (7) the refusal of United States executive departments to
receive, transmit, or supervise compliance with requests for judicial assistance when their foreign counterparts provided these services;14 and (8)
the problems generated by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 including difficulties in its construction, 8 its reference to often

Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Seychelles, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
Article 28 of the Convention permits accession to the agreement. Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, art. 28.
7. Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 819, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402,
480 (1973). For a helpful discussion of the travaux pr~paratoiresand corresponding
commentary reflecting on the purposes and mechanics of the Hague Service Convention,
see Note, supra note 4, at 393-98.
8. Jones, supra note 1, at 516-17.
9. Id. at 516. Civil law states presented a special challenge to the reciprocal inadequacy of judicial assistance. Id.
10. Id. at 534, 536.
11. Id. at 536. Jones narrates an example of the potential excessiveness of these fees.
A German lawyer sent a fee to a New York lawyer for service of process. The fee was
based on the amount in controversy rather than the fee of a process server because the
German bar stresses the amount in controversy in the computation of fees. The service
fee was for "several hundred dollars" at a time "[s]ome years ago" from the article's
1953 publication. See id. at 536 n.66.
12. Id. at 536-37.
13. For example, the common United States practice act requirement of verification
of proof of service is unknown to civil law. Id. at 537.
14. Id. at 539.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 4. For a discussion of the problems presented by Rule 4 in this
regard, see generally Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61
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inadequate provisions in federal statutes, 17 and its insufficient consideration of possible objections from foreign sovereigns.1 "
The plain language of the Convention's preamble sets forth the twofold purpose of the agreement: (1) the creation of appropriate means to
ensure timely notice of judicial and extrajudicial documents served
abroad; and (2) the simplification and expedition of such procedure to
improve the organization of mutual judicial assistance."
Article 1 indicates the scope of the Convention, stating that the Convention is applicable to all civil or commercial cases "where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service
abroad." 2 ° Articles 2 through 6 outline the basic structure for service
under the Convention. Competent authorities or judicial officers of the
originating state send requests for service that conform with the model
annexed to the Convention to the "Central Authority," which the recipient signatory state designates and organizes in conformity with that
state's law." The Central Authority determines whether the request
complies with the Hague Service Convention. 2 If there is compliance,
the Central Authority, under article 5, either directly serves the document on its national or has the document served by an appropriate
agency in accordance with the recipient state's internal law or by a
method requested by the applicant, provided the requested method is not
incompatible with the recipient state's internal law. 23 The Convention
directs the Central Authority to object promptly and specifically to noncomplying requests.24 Under certification requirements, the Central Authority presents to the applicant a certificate modeled after that annexed
to the Convention. 25 The certificate states either that the document was
served-including the method, place, and date of service, and the person

COLUM. L. REV. 1031 (1961).

16. Smit, supra note 15, at 1032-39. One problem in the construction of Rule 4
results from the Rule's reference to state law and federal statutes to determine when and
how foreign service may be made. The question arises whether other subdivisions of
Rule 4 or the corresponding provisions in the state laws or federal statutes apply when
performing extraterritorial service. Id. at 1035.
17. Id. at 1039-40.
18. Id. at 1032, 1040-43. This problem is still evident when state law, rather than
the federal rules, guides foreign service. Id. at 1041.
19. Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, preamble.
20. Id. art. 1.
21. Id. arts. 2, 3.
22. Id. art. 4.
23. Id. art. 5.
24. Id. art. 4.
25. Id. art. 6.

184

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:1:179

to whom service was delivered-or the reasons service was prevented.26
The model Request, Certificate, and Summary of the Document to be
Served-annexed to the Convention-are subject to language restrictions: The standard terms generally must be written in French or English, but may be written in an official language of the originating state;
the blanks are to be completed either in the recipient state's language,
French, or English.27 If the Central Authority determines that the request for service complies with the Convention and therefore serves the
document under a method provided by article 5, it additionally may require that the document itself be written in or translated into an official
language of the recipient state.28
Alternative methods of service are possible under the Hague Service
Convention. Article 8 allows direct service through diplomatic or consular agents. 29 Article 9 allows the recipient state to designate other authorities to receive service through the transferring state's consular channels or, in exceptional cases, diplomatic channels.30 Additionally, unless
incompatible with the recipient state's internal law, the receipient national may receive service through voluntary acceptance of the
31
document.
Article 10(a) provides that the "Convention shall not interfere
with . . . the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels,
directly to persons abroad."13 2 United States federal and state court interpretations of this last alternative method of service generate the difference of opinion that is mentioned above as arising from one of the two
main issues in the United States case law concerning the Hague Service
Convention. 3
A state may object to these alternative service methods. Articles 8 and
10 specifically provide for objections to service through consular or diplo-

26. Id.
27. Id. art. 7.

28. Id. art. 5.
29. Id. art. 8.
30. Id. art. 9. Article 9 also implies the obverse of this alternative method. Under
this article, a state's failure to designate other authorities to receive process indicates that
state's refusal of this alternative method of process. See supra note 23 and accompanying
text (discussing the alternative methods allowed through the Central Authority
mechanism).
31. Id. art. 5.
32. Id. art. 10(a).
33. See supra part I. This split in the case law concerns whether the use of the word
*"send" instead of "service" in article 10(a) means that service may never be effectuated
abroad through use of the mails. See infra part III.
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matic channels, or mail, respectively. 4 Article 21 establishes the formalities for making these objections.3 5 Under article 9, a state may refuse to
allow other authorities to receive service merely by not making a
designation."8
The United States Senate recognizes article 15, which addresses default judgments, 7 as equivalent to the United States due process
concept.3 8
B.

The Effect of Insufficient Service of Process

Although some courts dismiss actions because service offends the
Hague Service Convention provisions, 9 courts often quash the service
instead and give the plaintiff additional time to effect service in accordance with the Convention.4" The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit established this precedent in Vorhees v. Fischer &
Krecke.41 The court, while holding service invalid for noncompliance
with the Hague Service Convention, held that the lower court should not
have dismissed the action "until the plaintiffs were given a reasonable
opportunity to attempt to effect valid service" in compliance with the
Convention.42 This leniency runs flatly against the traditional and arguably integral requirement of statutes of limitation that a defendant
must be served before the running of the statute.43 Recognizing this re-

34. Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, arts. 8, 10.
35. Article 21 requires the objecting state to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Netherlands of its opposition to the use of the transmission methods provided
under articles 8 and 10. Id. art. 21.
36. Id. art. 9; see supra note 30.
37. Id. art. 15; Note, supra note 4, at 397.
38. Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 820, 109 Cal. Rptr.
402, 410 (1973) (citing 119 CONG. REc. 404 (1967)); see also infra notes 58, 138 and
accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Low v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G., 88 A.D.2d 504, 449
N.Y.S.2d 733 (1982).
40. See, e.g., Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Chem. Serv., 100 F.R.D. 775 (M.D.
La. 1984); Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1985); see also Cipolla v.
Picard Porsche Audi, 496 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1985); Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111
F.R.D. 464 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
41. 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983).
42. Id. at 576 (quoting Bailey v. Local 667, Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 480
F. Supp. 274, 278 (N.D.W. Va. 1979)) ("If the first service of process is ineffective, a
motion to dismiss should not be granted, but rather the Court should treat the motion in
the alternative, as one to quash the service of process and the case should be retained on
the docket pending effective service.").
43. Stoehr v. American Honda Motor Co., 429 F. Supp. 763, 767 (D. Neb. 1977).
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quirement, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
took the position that the running of the statute of limitations before
proper service precludes an action against a defendant even when the
lawsuit is timely filed."
II.

SCOPE OF THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION

The case law presents examples of the two extremes of the dichotomy
in United States jurisprudence concerning whether the Hague Service
Convention provides the exclusive means of service abroad. At one extreme is the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decision in DefJames v. Magnificence Carriers,holding that the Hague Service Convention specifies valid methods of effecting service only if the
United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or state long arm statutes
authorize service abroad."5 At the other end of the spectrum is the Rhode
Island Supreme Court decision in Cipolla v. PicardPorscheAudi, holding that state long arm statutes and rules notwithstanding, service abroad
must be perfected according to the Hague Service Convention under the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.46 In addition to this
typical state court position, some federal courts also rule that the Convention overrides the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, using supremacy
clause analysis in a slightly different form.4
A.

Strict Compliance Not Required

1. Scope
Through an analysis focused on the scope of the Hague Service Convention, the Defames court fully recognized the supremacy clause and
yet held the Hague Service Convention inapplicable to a United States
plaintiff's service on a foreign defendant that had its principal place of
44. Id. (citing Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, 480 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 994 (1974)).
45. 654 F.2d 280, 289 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
46. 496 A.2d 130, 132 (R.I. 1985). The supremacy clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or

Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

47. For a discussion of how supremacy clause analysis also applies to conflicts between the Hague Service Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see infra
part II, section B.1.
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business in Japan."8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit specifically defined the scope of the Convention and held that the
Convention does not provide independent authorization for service in a
foreign state, but merely provides a mechanism for a plaintiff, independently authorized to serve under its own state laws, to give appropriate
notice by a service method that is not objectionable to the foreign state. 9
In this way, the Hague Service Convention is truly the supreme law and
overrides United States federal and state methods for service abroad that
are objectionable to the foreign state.5" The court, however, limited this
supremacy to the methods, not the authorization, of service and held that
the Hague Service Convention "in [no] way affects a state's chosen limits
on the jurisdictional reach of its courts." 51

An important consequence of this reasoning, which allows a plaintiff
to bypass the standard Central Authority mechanism established by the
Convention, is relief from the translation requirements of the Convention.52 In Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia upheld strict reliance on
the Virginia long arm statute, which authorized direct mall service on a
Japanese defendant in Japan, when Japan had not objected to service by
mail under article 21 of the Hague Service Convention. 3 The court
noted that although Central Authorities may require translations of documents to be served under article 5, the plaintiff avoided the Japanese
Cefitral Authority by using direct mail service; there is no translation
requirement under article 10(a), which allows for mail service."

48. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280, 282-83, 288-89 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
49. Id. at 288-89. Stating that the same principle applies to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the court held the Hague Service Convention "merely serves as an important adjunct to state long-arm rules, and that it specifies a valid method of effecting
service only if the state long-arm rule authorizes service abroad." Id. at 289.
50.

Id. at 288-89.

51.

Id. at 289.

52.

See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.

53. 597 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D. Va. 1984). Article 10(a) provides the authorization for
mail service if the recipient state has not objected to this form of service. Hague Service
Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(a). Courts dispute this interpretation. See supra part I
and infra part III; see also note 33. Article 21 provides the method for objecting to this
form of service. Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, art. 21; see supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
54.

597 F. Supp. at 1086; see supra note 53.
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Due Process

Courts also justify noncompliance with the Hague Service Convention
on due process grounds. In Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court,5 5 the California Supreme Court found that the return receipt signed by the defendant was satisfactory evidence of actual delivery thereby validating
the service of the summons and complaint on a Japanese corporation's
head office in Japan. 6 The court upheld this form of service even
though the documents mailed were not written in Japanese, a requirement that the Japanese Central Authority could have imposed under article 5 of the Hague Service Convention if there had been compliance
with the Convention's terms.57 The court drew attention to the United
States Senate's recognition of article 15 of the Hague Service Convention
as the equivalent of the United States due process concept 5" and relied on
the United States Supreme Court's traditional statement of due process:
The adequacy of service "so far as due process is concerned is dependent
on whether or not the form of substituted service provided for such cases
and employed is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice . . . implicit in due process are
satisfied."

9

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
in Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L. followed Shoei and held

55. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
56. Id. at 823-24, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13.
57. The Shoei court distinguished Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1972), in which the same court upheld the lower court's refusal to enforce a
default judgment of a Swiss court against a local defendant. InJulen, the documents sent
to defendant by certified mail were written entirely in German and not described. Therefore, the Julen court held that defendant had not received fair notice, observing that the
Hague Service Convention itself calls for the use of English or French. By contrast, the
record in Shoei showed the use of English by Japanese companies involved in international trade. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 823, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412; see also supra notes
27-28 and accompanying text (discussing language requirements in the Hague Service
Convention); supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing possible methods of
circumventing the translation requirements imposed by Central Authorities).
58. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 410; see also supra notes 37-38
and accompanying text; infra note 138 and accompanying text.
59. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 409 (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The Milliken Court relied on its decision in MacDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) to recognize that substituted service on a domiciled
but absent defendant served at the defendant's usual place of abode in the state may be
wholly adequate to meet the due process requirements. Milliken, 311 U.S. at 462-63.
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service adequate despite that the service on the foreign defendant was not
effected pursuant to one of the specific methods set forth in the Hague
Service Convention.60 The court reasoned that although the service was
not in compliance with the Central Authority method of the Hague Service Convention, it nevertheless was proper under articles 5, 10, and 15
of the Convention.6 1 The court focused on the United States due process
requirement and held that whereas the Hague Service Convention sets
out a service method through a Central Authority, it does not necessarily
follow that a plaintiff cannot use other methods if the plaintiff can present "effective proof of / delivery." 6 2 The court buttressed its holding by
declaring that the Hague Service Convention preamble clearly shows
that the treaty's purpose is to simplify service to ensure that the defendant receives timely notice 3-a due process notion.
B.

Strict Compliance Required

1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
As in Cipolla v. PicardPorsche Audi," the United States courts that
require strict compliance with the Hague Service Convention rely primarily on the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Because the Hague Service Convention "establishes affirmative and judicially enforceable obligations without requiring any implementing
legislation," it is a self-executing treaty, thereby having legal effect equal
to acts of the United States Congress. 5 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as an act of Congress, are on equal footing with the Hague Service Convention under supremacy clause analysis. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accordingly held that because
the Hague Service Convention entered into force subsequent to the enactment of the Federal Rules, the Convention prevails over the Federal
60. 431 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill.), affid, 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
61. Tamari, 431 F. Supp. at 1229; Article 5 provides for voluntary acceptance of
service. Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, art. 5. Article 10(b) allows service directly through competent persons of the service recipient's state. Id. art. 10(b). Article 15
conveys the due process concept noted in Shoei. Id. art. 15; see supra notes 37-38, 58
and accompanying text; infra note 138 and accompanying text.
62.

Tamari, 431 F. Supp. at 1228 (quoting Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 109 Cal.

Rptr. at 411).
63. Id.
64. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
65. Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575-76 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Cook
v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194

(1888)).
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Rules of Civil Procedure when the two conflict. 6
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
reached the same result by a different interpretation of the supremacy
67
clause in Harris v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chemical Services.
The court held insufficient service on a West German corporation because the service was not in compliance with the Convention."8 The
court ruled that the Hague Service Convention prevails over the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure because, regarding service abroad, the Hague
Service Convention is specific and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are general.69 The court specifically rejected a later in time analysis
which, by the time of the court's 1984 decision in Harris,would have
determined Rule 4 to be controlling because Rule 4 was amended subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention.7
2.

State Long Arm Statutes

Courts usually decide the control issue in favor of the Hague Service
Convention when a plaintiff uses state procedural or business corporation law to serve a foreign defendant abroad. Unlike the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which are equal in weight to the Convention, state
laws are always of a lower authority than treaties. In Harris,the United

66. Id. at 575-76 (citing Cook, 288 U.S. at 119; Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194). The
court noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) became effective 1 July 1963, and
the Hague Service Convention entered into force for the United States on 10 February
1969, making the Hague Service Convention the "latter in time," and thereby superseding Rule 4(i). Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are United States statutes and
accordingly "are to be given equal dignity" as United States treaties. Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Chem. Serv., 100 F.R.D. 775, 777 (M.D. La. 1984) (citing Whitney,
124 U.S. 190); accord Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412; Tamari,
431 F. Supp. at 1229. The Vorhees decision, containing the "latter in time" analysis
which favored the Hague Service Convention, Vorhees, 697 F.2d at 576, came on the eve
of the 1983 amendments to Rule 4. Under the court's theory, in times after the amendment, Rule 4 would control over the Hague Service Convention. A United States district
court decision after the amendment rejected this outcome by use of a different analysis.
Harris, 100 F.R.D. at 777; see infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
67. 100 F.R.D. 775 (M.D. La. 1984).
68. Id. at 777-78.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 778. Congress amended Rule 4 in 1983, after the entry into force of the
Convention in 1969. Id. at 777; see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Vorhees "latter in time" analysis). For a detailed analysis of the interplay between the Hague Service Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Note,
supra note 3.
71. See generally supra part I; notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana conclusively
declared, "If the provisions of state law conflict with the provisions of an
international treaty, by virtue of the supremacy clause the provisions of
72
the treaty must prevail."
The Alabama Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the Hague Service
Convention superseded its own state civil procedure rules, even though
the state rules specifically provided several methods of foreign service.7 3
The New York Appellate Division similarly found that its state business corporation law could not override the application of the Hague
Service Convention.7 4 In Reynolds v. Koh, the court held that the sending of an amended summons and complaint by registered mail, return
receipt requested, to a Japanese corporate defendant in Japan, with a
copy delivered to the New York Secretary of State pursuant to the New
York business corporation law, did not satisfy the Hague Service Convention.7 5 The court declared that reliance on business corporation law

for a service method contrary to the Hague Service Convention was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. 6
Although the Japanese corporation voluntarily accepted the mailed service, the court held that the service did not comply with article 5(b) of
the Hague Service Convention, which allows service by additional particular methods requested by the applicant if not incompatible with the
recipient state's law.77 The court based its rationale on the fact that the
plaintiff never requested service by mail and found Japanese and New
York law incompatible to the extent that the latter allowed direct service
by one litigant upon another.7
In Low v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G., the New York Appellate
Division held that the use of business corporation law service methods
does not override the Hague Service Convention requirements.7 The
court held that compliance with New York business corporation law, by
serving the New York Secretary of State and mailing a copy of the service by registered mail to Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G. (BMW-AG)
in West Germany, was improper under the Hague Service Convention

72. Harris,100 F.R.D. at 777 (citing Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d
280 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)).
73.

Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1983).

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 97, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 100, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
Id.
Id.

79.

88 A.D.2d 504, 449 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1982).
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because West Germany had objected to article 10 mail service.8"

C. Agency Considerations
1. Failed Attempts to Avoid Compliance through Agency
The Low court also addressed whether the appointment of BMW of
North America (BMW-NA) as BMW-AG's agent for service under section 1399(e) of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act,8" made service upon
BMW-NA for BMW-AG proper in a products liability action.8 2 Noting
that Bollard v. Volkswagenwerke, A.G. s allowed service on the section
1399(e) appointed agent in a private action against a manufacturer, the
court followed the "weight of authority, declining to follow Bollard,"
and held "that 'the appointment of an agent under § 1399(e) is solely for
the purposes of expediting enforcement of the [Motor Vehicle] Safety Act
and is not a general agency appointment.'" 8
Courts consider other general agency grounds to circumvent compliance with the Hague Service Convention. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow substituted service on a "managing or general agent, or
; . . any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service."8 5 The New York legislature adopted this language into the
New York business corporation law and the New York Appellate Division considered it in Low, yet the court determined that the record did
not support a finding that BMW-NA was an agent of BMW-AG as
described in the statute.86 To the court, however, such an agency finding
would have allowed service on BMW-AG, doing business itself or
of
through BMW-NA as BMW-AG's agent in the state, by delivery 87
service of BMW-NA, regardless of any authorization to receive service.
The New York Appellate Division did not find that BMW-NA was
so completely controlled by BMW-AG that it was merely a department

80. Id. at 505, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 735. As a result of this ineffective service, the New
York court did not obtain jurisdiction under New York business corporation law. Id.; see
infra part III (discussing whether service by mail is ever permissible under the Hague
Service Convention).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1399(e) (1988).
82. Low, 88 A.D.2d at 505, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
83. 313 F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
84. Low, 88 A.D.2d at 505, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 735 (quoting Rubino v. Celeste Motors,
No. 72-C-350 (N.D.N.Y., October 11, 1984)) (citations omitted).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
86. Low, 88 A.D.2d at 505-06, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
87. Id.
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of BMW-AG. 8 It did, however, recognize cases in which "mere department" findings lead to holdings that the subsidiary represents the parent
for service purposes.8 9
2.

Circumvention of the Hague Service Convention through Agency

The cases that do allow service on foreign defendants by circumvention of the Hague Service Convention requirements more often involve
this broad, "mere department" type service on a foreign national's agent,
a wholly owned subsidiary in the forum. Two courts in cases involving
service on the West German corporation, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (VWAG), through its wholly owned United States subsidiary in
the forum, Volkswagen of America (VWoA), allowed service on the subsidiary as the foreign corporation's agent for service of process without
any specific appointment of the subsidiary to this effect.90 In Ex Parte
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, the Alabama Supreme Court found
service on the wholly owned, New Jersey subsidiary sufficient to obtain
jurisdiction over the West German parent corporation that had a high
degree of control over the internal affairs of the subsidiary and determined the subsidiary's daily operations.9 1 The court determined that the
subsidiary was the "alter ego" of the parent even though the subsidiary
"hire[d] and fire[d] its own employees, [wa]s adequately capitalized,
maintain[ed] its own bank accounts, and purchase[ed] products from
other manufacturers." 2 The court framed the issue to set out an explicit
rule providing that if "[the wholly owned subsidiary] can be considered
the agent of [the foreign parent] for the purpose of service of process . . . then the summons and complaint served on [the wholly owned
subsidiary] on the behalf of [the foreign parent] is good and sufficient

88. Id. at 505-06, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 735-36.
89. Id. at 506, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 735 (citing Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce
of England, 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965); Geffen Motors v.
Chrysler Corp., 54 Misc. 2d 403, 283 N.Y.S.2d 79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)).
90. Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (VWAG), 443 So. 2d 880 (Ala.
1983); Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 104 F.R.D. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
91. VWAG, 443 So. 2d 880.
92. Id. at 884, 885. The court held that "these factors merely indicate that the parent
and subsidiary are formally structured as two separate corporations" and would not allow these formalities to overshadow the real connection between the companies. Id. Although not cited by the court, earlier support exists for finding service on a subsidiary
proper where the subsidiary is the "alter-ego" of the parent. ABKCO Indus. v. Lennon,
52 A.D.2d 435, 440, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784 (1976) (citing Public Admin'r of New York
v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1967)),

affd in part, modified in part, 52 A.D.2d 435, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1976).
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service on [the foreign parent]." 9 3

This formulation of the proper service test allowed the court to reverse
the traditional supremacy clause analysis. Rather than use supremacy
clause analysis to determine whether the service of process was conducted under the proper law, the court made an independent determination of whether the service was proper to determine whether the
supremacy clause was violated:
[I]f service of process on VWoA as the alter ego of VWAG is not good
and sufficient service on VWAG, then requiring VWAG to submit to the
trial court's jurisdiction would be in disregard of the provisions of the
Hague Convention and, therefore, in violation of the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution . . .94
In Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida similarly held the
Hague Service Convention inapplicable to the determination of the validity of the service; the court found this determination properly made
under common law agency theory when the foreign corporation or its
agent is located and served in the United States.95 In Lamb, sufficient
evidence of control over the United States subsidiary by the West German parent corporation supported the finding that the United States
subsidiary could be considered the agent of the West German corporation for the purpose of effecting valid service on the West German
corporation. 6
These two courts followed cases providing a clear precedent that the
United States District Court-for the District of Kansas aptly summarized
in Professional Investors Life Insurance Co. v. Roussel:
The rationale of the courts which have extended jurisdiction over a foreign
parent corporation on the basis of a subsidiary's "presence" within the
state is that when the parent corporation exercises such control and domination over the subsidiary that it no longer has a will, mind, or existence
of its own, and operates merely as a department of the parent corporation,
both corporations should be treated as a single economic entity. In such a
situation service of process on the subsidiary operates to extend jurisdic7
tion over the parent.1

93. VWAG, 443 So. 2d at 881.
94. Id. at 882 (footnote omitted).
95. Lamb, 104 F.R.D. at 97.
96. Id. at 100-01.
97. 445 F. Supp. 687, 698 (D. Kan. 1978) (citing Farha v. Signal Cos., 216 Kan.
471, 532 P.2d 1330 (1975), opinion modified, 217 Kan. 43, 535 P.2d 463 (1975)). In
Professional Investors, the mere allegation of a "family business" controlling various
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Courts use a number of formulations to indicate the degree of control
necessary to establish agency for purposes of service. The parent-subsidiary relation alone ordinarily is not enough;98 a manufacturer-distributor
relationship alone also is not enough.99 The "mere department" determination, as noted above, is sufficient for some courts to hold proper substituted service on a subsidiary."' 0 A number of courts declare that control
such that the subsidiary "no longer has a will, mind, or existence of its
own" is the test.1"' The Alabama Supreme Court utilized the "alter ego"
formulation.' 2 The New York Appellate Division also used the "alter
ego" test to find substituted service proper.103 New York courts have
held that service on a wholly owned subsidiary that is a "mere instrumentality" of the parent constitutes valid service on the parent. 0 4 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in
Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 0 5 adopted the test formulated by the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri in Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.:
The parties seeking to prove proper service must at least show that the
parent exercises such a degree of control over the subsidiary that the activities of the subsidiary are the activities of the parent or show that the
subsidiary's activities are controlled by the parent to the extent that the
subsidiary is only a department of the parent.10 8
As hinted by this language, the plaintiff must establish agency because
the plaintiff has the burden of proving proper service once it is con-

corporations, including defendant's business, was insufficient to trigger in personam jurisdiction, although other facts made the exercise proper. Id. at 698.
98. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); Jones v. Volkswagen of America, 82 F.R.D. 334, 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
99. Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965).
100. See generally supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text; see also supra note 96
and accompanying text; infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Professional Investors, 445 F. Supp. at 698; see also supra note 97
and accompanying text.

102. VWAG, 443 So. 2d 880, 884; see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
103. ABKCO Indus., 52 A.D.2d at 440, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 784; Royal Bank of Canada, 19 N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877, 278 N.Y.S.2d 378; see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
104. Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d
329, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965).

105. 104 F.R.D. 95, 98 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
106. 552 F. Supp. 73, 79 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (citing ProfessionalInvestors, 445 F.
Supp. at 698; Stoehr v. American Honda Motor Co., 429 F. Supp. 763, 765-66 (D. Neb.
1977)).
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tested."0 This inquiry into the relationship between the parent and its
subsidiary is so crucial that in McHugh v. InternationalComponents,'0 8
the New York Superior Court granted a motion for discovery of jurisdictional facts to determine whether the Japanese defendant and its United
States subsidiary "[we]re one" so that service on the subsidiary would be
valid service on the defendant Japanese corporation.'0 The court in McHugh explicitly noted that it is not necessary that the subsidiary be independently subject to the court's jurisdiction. 1 '
The Washington Supreme Court stated the policies behind these holdings in Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft."' In that case the
court refused to quash substituted service on VWAG's wholly owned
subsidiary."1 2 In Crose, the physical service was even further removed
from the name defendant than in the usual case of substituted service on
a wholly owned subsidiary; service was performed on VWAG by service
on CT Corporation, the agent for service for Riviera Motors, a wholly
owned subsidiary of VWoA, which itself is a wholly owned subsidiary of
VWAG." 3 The court's primary concern was fairness to the parties." 4
The court distinguished cases in which courts facing "the same distribution scheme and a similar state jurisdictional statute ...

reached a con-

trary result,"" 5 stating that these courts did not "fully consider[] the
intricacy or the economic reality of the [VWAG] and [VWoA] distribution system.""' 6 The court couched its decision in terms of policy rationale: "Those corporations involved in the Volkswagen distribution scheme
107. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554, 557 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1101 (1984).
108. 118 Misc. 2d 489, 461 N.Y.S.2d 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
109. Id. at 492, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
110. Id.
111. 88 Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764 (1977).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 52-53, 558 P.2d at 765-66. Process was also served directly on an officer
of VWAG in West Germany. Id. at 52, 558 P.2d at 766.
114. Id. at 57, 558 P.2d at 768. The court considered the following factors to conclude that VWAG and VWoA were properly subject to service in Washington: (1) the
state's interest in providing a forum for its residents; (2) the availability of another forum; (3) the amount, kind, and continuity of VWAG's activities in the state; (4) the
significance of the economic benefit derived by VWAG resulting from its purposeful activities in the state; and (5) the foreseeability of injury resulting from the use of Volkswagen products traveling through the entire Volkswagen distribution chain. Id.
115. Id. at 56, 558 P.2d at 767-68 (citing Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 29
N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972); Lynch v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Minn. 1970); Ritter v. Volkswagen Werk GmbH,
322 F. Supp. 569 (D. Minn. 1970)).
116. Crose, 88 Wash. 2d at 56, 558 P.2d at 768.
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should not be allowed to circumvent the rights of the citizens of this state
or to provide themselves with immunity merely by their choice of organi117
zational form.1
This case is especially significant because the court found that CT
Corporation's failure to advise Riviera Motors of the service did not affect the service's validity." 8 Rather than rely on this lack of actual notice, the court focused on the "intricate linking of [VWAG], [VWoA]
and Riviera in the worldwide manufacture, sales, and distribution network.""1 The court found it "reasonably certain that [Riviera] would
turn over the process to those called upon to answer" because of Riviera's "responsible representative status in relationship to [VWAG] and
1 20
[VWoA]" as found from all the surrounding facts.
IIl.

SERVICE OF PROCESS MAILED DIRECTLY ABROAD UNDER THE
HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION

United States jurisprudence exhibits clearly countervailing cases on
the issue of whether the Hague Service Convention allows the direct
mailing of service abroad. The language of the Convention itself, article
10(a), provides the basis of the controversy: "Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with
• . .the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly
'121
to persons abroad.
A.

Mail Service Impermissible

The argument against the Hague Service Convention permitting service by mail as an alternative to the Central Authority method12 2 is
based on statutory construction. In Mommsen v. Toro Co.,1123 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa relied on popular
canons of statutory construction relating to plain meaning,1 24 legislative
117. Id. at 56, 558 P.2d at 767.
118. Id. at 58, 558 P.2d at 769. Perhaps the court was influenced by the fact that a
copy of the service was mailed to VWAG in West Germany. See supra note 113.
119. Crose, 88 Wash. 2d at 59, 558 P.2d at 769.
120. Id. at 58, 558 P.2d at 769.
121. Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(a).
122. For a discussion of the primary Central Authority service method outlined by
the Hague Service Convention and alternative methods, see supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
123. 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
124. Id. at 446; see id. (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)) ("[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,
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intent, 12 5 and established meaning in equity and common law.26 to find
mail service impermissible under the Convention:
The Hague Convention repeatedly refers to "service" of documents, and if
the drafters of the Convention had meant for subparagraph (a) of Article
10 to provide an additional manner of service of judicial documents, they
would have used the word "service." To hold that subparagraph (a) permits direct mail service of process, would go beyond the plain meaning of
the word "send" and would create a method of service of process at odds
with other methods of service permitted by the Convention. Sending a
copy of a summons and complaint by registered mail directly to a defendant in a foreign country is not a method of service of process allowed by
the Hague Convention. 2 '
One year later, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi announced that it faced "precisely the same" issue
faced in Mommsen and agreed with the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa, claiming that the "better reasoned view"
is that the Hague Service Convention precludes service by mail. 28

that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.").
125. Mommsen, 108 F.R.D. at 446. The court quoted Russelo v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (Where a legislative body "includes a particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that [the legislative body] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.").
126. Mommsen, 108 F.R.D. at 446. The court quoted NLRB v. Amax Coal Co.,
453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (Where a legislative body "uses terms that have accumulated
meaning under either equity or the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
otherwise dictates, that the [legislative body] means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.").
127. Momnsen, 108 F.R.D. at 446. The Hague Service Convention makes a substantial number of references to "service." See Hague Service Convention, supra note 2,
preamble ("documents to be served"); id. art. 1 ("service abroad" and "person to be
served"); id. art. 2 ("requests for service"); id. art. 3 ("document to be served"); id. art.
5 ("shall itself serve ... or... have it served," "method...

for ... service," "served by

delivery," "document is to be served," "document to be served," and "shall be served");
id. art. 6 ("document has been served," "date of service," "has not been served," and
"prevented service"); id. art. 8 ("free to effect service," "opposed to such service," and
"document is to be served"); id. art. 9 ("for the purpose of service"); id. art. 10 ("to
effect service" and "to effect service"); id. art. 11 ("for the purpose of service"); id. art.
12 ("service of judicial documents" and "method of service"); id. art. 13 ("request for
service"); id. art. 14 ("documents for service"); id. art. 15 ("for the purpose of service,"
"served by a method," "for the service of documents," "the service or the delivery," and
"certificate of service or delivery"); id. arts. 16, 17 ("for the purpose of service"); id. art.
19 ("for service").
128. Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 466 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
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The statutory construction argument against foreign service of process
by mail under the Hague Service Convention found favor in the case law
of New York in Ormandy v. Lynn. 129 The New York Supreme Court
relied on the intent of the signatory states as evidenced in the Hague
Service Convention provisions and the ordinary meaning of the term
"send" to conclude that article 10(a) did not authorize mail service on
the Japanese defendant.1 30 On policy grounds, the court declared that "a
liberal reading of 'send' to include effective service of legal process would
vitiate the fundamental intent of the parties to establish more formal
modes of service."' 31
The New York Appellate Division adopted the Ormandy position in
Reynolds v. Koh as the interpretation most consistent with the intent and
design of the Hague Service Convention." 2 Use of both "send" and "service" in the Convention indicated to the court that article 10(a) authorized "something other than 'service' in the legal sense, such as the mere
transmittal of notices and legal documents which need not be 'served' in
the legal sense."' 33
B.

Mail Service Permissible

The cases interpreting the Hague Service Convention to allow foreign
service by mail rely on the entire purpose of the Convention and due
process rationale. In Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court considered the entire scope of the Convention to outweigh the -albeit somewhat meritorious-distinction between "send"
and "service. ' " Because the Hague Service Convention as a whole is
concerned with the service abroad of judicial documents, the court concluded that "[t]he reference to 'the freedom to send judicial documents by
postal channels, directly to persons abroad' would be superfluous unless
it was related to the sending of such documents for the purpose of service."' 3 5 This reference is placed in the Convention among the alternatives to the Central Authority method, supporting the inference that the

129. 122 Misc. 2d 954, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
130. Id. at 955, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
131. Id., 472 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
132. 109 A.D.2d 97, 100, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295, 298 (1985). The court stated that a
contrary holding would diminish the role of Japan's Central Authority, and thus counter
the intentions of the drafters of the Hague Service Convention. Id.
133. Id. at 99, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 297-98.
134. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 821, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 411 (1973).
135. Id.
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method represents another alternative service mechanism."3 6 Additionally, the court decided that the Hague Service Convention does not forbid mail service because such an understanding of the treaty ratified by
the United States Senate would abrogate the Senate's earlier purpose
expressed in Rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to expe37

dite service abroad.1

On due process grounds, the court noted that article 15 of the Hague
Service Convention is equivalent to the United States due process concept.138 Because the court believed internal Japanese law did not prohibit mail service with evidence of delivery, and because Japan did not
specifically object to mail service under the Convention procedures, the
court held that the service was within the letter and spirit of Japanese
law.1

39

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia freely
accepted that article 10(a) allows foreign mail service in the absence of
an objection by the foreign state. 4 The court cited Shoei4 without discussion and noted the benefit of this unobtrusive method.1 1
136. Id. The alternative methods of service appear in articles 8, 9, and 10 of the
Convention. Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, arts. 8-10; see supra notes 29-36
and accompanying text.
137. The court found that the United States Senate intended to retain Rule 4(i) mail
service unless the foreign state objects because the Federal Rules were amended after the
treaty entered into force without any change in Rule 4(i). Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 821,
109 Cal. Rptr. at 411. This is analogous to the "latter in time" supremacy clause analysis discussed at supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
138. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 410; see also supra notes 3738, 58 and accompanying text.
139. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412; see supra note 53 and
accompanying text; infra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing a similar holding
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia).
The Shoei court, however, mistakenly concluded that Japanese law permits service of
process by mail. The California Court of Appeals corrected this misapprehension in
1988. See Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 1480-81, 249
Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1988) ("Japan does not have an internal legal system which allows
service of process by registered mail.").
Because service of process in Japan-unlike the United States-requires the authorization of a Japanese court, service by a private party constitutes an impermissible encroachment on Japanese sovereignty. Such private service therefore is without legal effect. See generally Kim & Sisneros, Comparative Overview of Service of Process: United
States, Japan, and Attempts at International Unity, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
-(1990).

140. Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors, 589 F. Supp. 1182, 1206 (D.D.C. 1984).
141. Id. The court quoted FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson,
636 F.2d 1300, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[S]ervice of process from the United States into
a foreign country by registered mail may thus be viewed as the least intrusive means of
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
also held mail service not contrary to the Hague Service Convention because Japan had not objected to mail service.142 Similarly, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia approved mail
service in accordance with the Virginia long arm statute when Japan
had not objected to such service under the mechanism provided by the
Convention.'" Although holding service proper or improper on other
grounds, other courts have also expressly or impliedly interpreted the
mail service unless the forHague Service Convention to allow foreign
1 44
method.
the
to
objects
explicitly
state
eign
IV. RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ANSWERS TO THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION

In two cases decided exactly one year apart, the United States Supreme Court first hinted at and then ostensibly answered the question
concerning the scope of the Hague Service Convention in favor of the
exclusivity of the Hague Service Convention over the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and state long arm statutes.'4 5
A.

Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States
District Court

In Socit Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale v. United States District Court,14 6 the United States Supreme Court ruled on the effect of

the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention). 4 7 Before the case

service-i.e., the device which minimizes the imposition upon the local authorities caused
by official U.S. government action within the boundaries of the local state.").
1985).
142. Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194, 199 (N.D. Ill.
143. Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 597 F. Supp. 1082, 1085-86 (E.D. Va.
1984); see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 769 (Ala. 1983) (mailed service
held ineffective because West Germany objected to service by any method other than
through the Minister of Justice, its Central Authority under the Hague Service
Convention).
145. These Supreme Court decisions are Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale
v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987), and Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S.Ct. 2104 (1988).
146. Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. 522.
147. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847
U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Oct. 7, 1972) [hereinafter Hague Evidence
Convention].
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reached the Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit adopted the analysis of the Fifth Circuit 1 48 and held the
Hague Evidence Convention does not apply when a district court has
jurisdiction over a foreign litigant, even when the information sought
through discovery is physically located within the territory of the foreign
signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention. 4 9 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court held the Hague Evidence Convention does not
provide exclusive or mandatory procedures for discovery in a foreign signatory's territory.5 0 The Court agreed with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in rejecting the "extreme position"'' that
the Hague Evidence Convention supplies the exclusive or mandatory discovery procedures in a foreign state. The Court, however, did not affirm
the ruling of the Eighth Circuit because it likewise rejected the court's
position on the other extreme: that the Hague Evidence Convention does
not apply to discovery on a foreign litigant over which a United States
court has established jurisdiction.' 52 Rather, the Court declared that the
Hague Evidence Convention, although not exclusive, is optional and that
its procedures are available and a court may choose to apply them
"whenever they will facilitate the gathering of evidence by the means
authorized in the [Hague Evidence] Convention."' 3
The Court based its ruling on the purposes of the Hague Evidence
Convention as stated in its preamble: "to facilitate the transmission and
execution of Letters of Request" and to "improve mutual judicial cooperation in civil or commercial matters."'5 4 The Court buttressed its
holding that the application of the Hague Evidence Convention is optional by comparing the permissive language of the Hague Evidence
Convention with the mandatory language of the Hague Service Convention. The Court here hinted at what it explicitly held one year later.1 55

148. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 483
U.S. 1002 (1987), quoted with approval in In re Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 124 (8th Cir. 1986).
149. Agrospatiale, 782 F.2d at 124.

150. 482 U.S. at 529.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 540. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion. Id. at 547.
153. Id. at 541.
154. Id. at 534 (quoting the Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 147,
preamble).
155. Le., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988).
For a discussion of Schlunk, see infra part IV, section B.
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The foreshadowing appears in a footnote:
The Hague Conference on Private International Law's omission of
mandatory language in the preamble is particularly significant in light of
the same body's use of mandatory language in the preamble to the Hague
Service Convention .

. .

. Article 1 of the Service Convention provides:

"The present Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial
matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad." . . . [T]he Service Convention was drafted

before the Evidence Convention, and its language provided a model exclusivity provision that the drafters of the Evidence Convention could easily
have followed had they been so inclined. Given this background, the drafters' election to use permissive language instead is strong evidence of their
intent.1 56
B. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk
The Court explicitly reinforced 1' and expounded upon the mandatory
nature of the Hague Service Convention one year later in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk." 8 This case arose in the Illinois
courts.159 After the Illinois Supreme Court denied appeal,1 60 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the disagreement
among lower courts concerning the applicability of the Hague Service
Convention. 16 '
The factual situation surrounding the case is typical of others discussed in this Note, especially those cases considering the effects of
156. Agrospatiale,482 U.S. at 534 n.15 (quoting Hague Service Convention, supra
note 2, preamble).
157. The Court cited Agrospatiale for its acknowledgement the previous term of the
mandatory nature of article 1 of the Hague Service Convention. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at
2108.
158. 108 S.Ct. 2104 (1988).
159. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 145 Ill. App. 3d 594, 503
N.E.2d 1045 (1986), affd, 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988).
160. 112 Ill.2d 595 (1986).
161. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2107. The Court listed several cases holding the Hague
Service Convention inapplicable to service on a foreign national properly served through
its domestic agent. Id. (citing Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d
880, 881 (Ala. 1983); Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194, 199-200 (N.D. Ill. 1985);
Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 104 F.R.D. 95, 97 (S.D. Fla. 1985); McHugh v. International Components, 118 Misc. 2d 489, 491-92, 461 N.Y.S.2d 166, 16768 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)). The Court also listed cases holding the Hague Service Convention the exclusive means by which to serve a foreign corporation. Id. (citing Cipolla v.
Picard Porsche Audi, 496 A.2d 130, 131-32 (R.I. 1985); Wingert v. Volkswagenwerk
A.G., Nos. 3:86-2994-16 and 3:86-2995-16 (D.S.C. May 19, 1987)).
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agency on the applicability of the Hague Service Convention.1 6 2
In Schlunk, plaintiff'6 3 filed a wrongful death suit against Volkswagen of America (VWoA)... in the Illinois Circuit Court in Cook
County, Illinois."6 5 VWoA, importer and distributor for the designer and
manufacturer, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (VWAG), was served
through C.T. Corporation, VWoA's registered agent for service of process in Illinois, and timely filed an appearance and answer.' 6 6 Plaintiff
then amended his complaint to join VWAG and allege design defects.'6 7
Service was first attempted by plaintiff on VWAG through C.T. Corporation. After C.T. Corporation refused to accept the service, an alias
summons was issued to C.T. Corporation to serve VWoA "as agent for"
VWAG. 68 VWAG filed a special and limited appearance to quash service, supported by an affidavit of VWoA's manager and product liaison
asserting that VWoA was separate and independent and was an agent
for VWAG only to receive notices under the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act.' 6 9 The Cook County Circuit Court found that
VWoA, a New Jersey corporation having its principal place of business
in Michigan and registered to do business in Illinois, was not appointed
by VWAG as its agent for service in common law actions. VWoA, nevertheless, was VWAG's wholly owned subsidiary with a majority of its
directors on VWAG's Board of Management and was tied to VWAG by
an exclusive importer and distributor agreement. 70 On this basis, the
court concluded that VWoA and VWAG were "so closely related" that
162. See supra part II, section C. Service in Schlunk was very similar to that in
Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764 (1977), and

also involved some of the same parties. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
163. Plaintiff, Herwig J. Schlunk, filed this action as administrator of the estates of
Franz J. Schlunk and Sylvia Schlunk, plaintiff's parents, who were killed in a head-on
collision in Cook County, Illinois. Schlunk, v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 145
I1. App. 3d 594, 594-95, 503 N.E.2d 1045, 1045.
164. Dennis J. Reed, apparently the driver of the other vehicle, was also named as a
defendant. Reed was served by a special process server and subsequently a default judgment was entered against him. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 1045-46.
167. Id. at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 1046.
168. Id.
169. Id. The agency requirement is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1339(e) (1988). In addition to this affidavit, the record included documents partially reflecting the relationship

between VWAG and VWoA and interrogatory answers from both VWAG and VWoA.
Schlunk v. VWAG, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 595, 503 N.E.2d at 1046. Most courts find
section 1339(e) agency appointment alone insufficient for service in unrelated claims. See
supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.

170.

Schlunk v. VWAG, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 595-96, 503 N.E.2d at 1046.
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VWoA was VWAG's agent for service as a matter of law, even though
VWAG failed or refused to make a formal appointment. 171 The court,
therefore, held that the alias service was effective under both the Illinois
Supreme Court Rules and Illinois Code and was not in conflict with the
Hague Service Convention, which the court found applicable only to ser2
17
vice outside the United States.

On VWAG's application, two questions of law were certified to the
Appellate Court of Illinois: (1) whether the substituted service method at
issue violated the Hague Service Convention; and (2) whether VWoA
and VWAG were so closely related that VWoA was VWAG's agent for
73
service of process.
In affirming the Cook County Circuit Court, the Illinois Court of Appeals countered VWAG's two main arguments. First, VWAG contended
that the Hague Service Convention provides the exclusive method for
foreign service on residents in signatory states, of which West Germany
is one.'" The court responded that the Hague Service Convention, by its
own terms, was inapplicable because Illinois state law does not require
service abroad, and article I of the Hague Service Convention clearly
states that the Convention is applicable only "where there is occasion to
transmit a judicial or extra-judicial document for service abroad.' 7 5 In
the Illinois Court of Appeals' view, an opposite holding would render
the Hague Service Convention a shield to protect foreign nationals even
when they are present in the state. 76 Other courts had rejected such an
outcome. 7 The Illinois court relied upon the purpose of the Hague Service Convention as simplifying the procedures for timely notice, and on
article 10(c) of the Convention, which allows direct service if there is no
objection by the state of destination. The court concluded that "[i]f
VWoA, which is located in this country, is an agent of VWAG here,
then the United States is the 'State of destination' under the treaty, and
78
the treaty allows plaintiff to effect service using American procedure."'1

171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 1046.
Id.
Id.
Id.
175. Id. at 596, 503 N.E.2d at 1046-47 (quoting Hague Service Convention, supra
note 2, art. 1).
176. Id. at 597, 503 N.E.2d at 1047.

177. Id. at 597-98, 503 N.E.2d at 1047 (citing Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 104 F.R.D. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194, 199-

200 (N.D. Ill.
1985); McHugh v. Int'l Components, 118 Misc. 2d 489, 491, 461
N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)).
178. Id. at 598, 503 N.E.2d at 1047-48. The court rejected VWAG's reliance on
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Second, VWAG posited that because of the unfairness of subjecting
foreign residents to the various procedures of the fifty United States, the
purpose of the Hague Service Convention was to achieve a uniform
method of service."' 9 The court questioned why foreign nationals warrant greater protection against this unfairness than do United States citizens, holding that "VWAG .. .conceded away this preemption argument by acknowledging that domiciliaries of foreign states can waive the
protection of the Hague [Service] Convention by appointing an agent for
' 80
service of process in the United States."'
The main issue, therefore, became whether serving VWoA as
VWAG's agent constituted valid service.'8 1 The court discussed this in
the context of the two prerequisites for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Illinois: (1) sufficient activity in the state; and (2) service in accordance with Illinois law. 18 2 Illinois decisions provide two theories to
support valid service on the parent by way of service on its subsidiary:
(1) that the parent is "doing business" in the state;... and (2) that the
subsidiary is the "alter ego" of the parent.8 The plaintiff argued
VWAG was doing business in Illinois by virtue of its relationship with
VWoA based on thirty years of operations under a written importer
agreement.18 5 The court noted that written disclaimers of agency, like
the one in this importer agreement, are not controlling and that the case
law is unsettled as to whether VWAG's control over VWoA is pervasive
enough to find agency.'8 The court stressed the factual nature of this
Low v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G., 88 A.D.2d 504, 449 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1982),
stating that the New York court did not rule against service through the West German
corporation's wholly owned subsidiary, and Cipolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, 496 A.2d
130 (R.I. 1985), stating that the Rhode Island court did not hold that the Hague Service
Convention precludes service on VWoA as VWAG's agent. Schlunk v. VWAG, 145 Ill.
App. 3d at 598-99, 503 N.E.2d at 1048. These cases are discussed supra at notes 79-89
and accompanying text, and notes 46, 64 and accompanying text, respectively.
179. Schlunk v. VWAG, 145 Ill.
App. 3d at 599, 503 N.E.2d at 1048.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 600, 503 N.E.2d at 1049. VWAG did not claim that it lacked sufficient
activity in the state. Id. at 599, 503 N.E.2d at 1048.
183. Id. at 600, 503 N.E.2d at 1049.
184. Id. at 601, 503 N.E.2d at 1050.
185. Id. at 602, 503 N.E.2d at 1050.
186. Id. The court listed cases that considered the importer agreement between
VWAG and VWoA and ultimately found an agency relationship. Id. (citing Roorda v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 F. Supp. 868, 870-80 (D.S.C. 1979); Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 104 F.R.D. 95, 97-101 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880, 882-85 (Ala. 1983)). The court also listed cases
reaching the opposite result. Id. (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. McCurdy,
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inquiry and in this case decided that VWAG exercised enough control
over VWoA for a finding that VWoA was VWAG's agent for service of
18 7

process.

In support of its conclusion that the "relationship between VWAG
and VWoA is so close that it is certain that VWAG 'was fully apprised
of the pendency of the [action]' by delivery of the summons to
VWoA," 1 the Illinois Court of Appeals adopted, among other things,
the lack of free will language of Professional Investors Life Insurance
Co. v. Roussel,' 89 without attribution; the court found that "VWoA exercises no free will of its own in deciding whether to accept the importer
agreement or any other aspect of its relationship with VWAG."1 90 Still,
the court claimed that Illinois courts avoid labels such as "alter ego" or
"mere department" to define the control necessary to render sufficient
service on a parent corporation through its subsidiary based on the relationship between the two.19 The court also claimed that this relationship
need not go so far that the control of the parent company over its sihbsidiary makes the entities "essentially one," thus allowing the court to "disregard the corporate entities and hold service of process on one corporation effective as to the others." '92
After this discourse, the court held that the relationship between
VWoA and VWAG was such that VWoA was VWAG's agent for ser-

340 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1977);
quoting Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Mo. 1982)).
187. The court remarked on several factors supporting this finding. First, VWoA
was wholly owned by VWAG and was bound to sell its products only within its territory, yet VWoA was required to do maintenance and repair on VWAG automobiles
regardless of where they were sold. Second, VWAG could terminate the importer agreement without prior notice in the case of VWoA business or financial problems. Third,
VWAG controlled VWoA's choice of dealers and dominated the VWoA Board of Directors, often conducting meetings in West Germany. Fourth, VWoA was required by contract to advise VWAG of all aspects of the business. And fifth, VWoA was authorized to
prosecute trademark infringement in VWAG's name. Schlunk v. VWAG, 145 I1. App.
3d at 606, 503 N.E.2d at 1053.
188. Id. (quoting Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, 102 Il. 2d 342, 353,
466 N.E.2d 217, 233, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984)).
189. 445 F. Supp. 687, 698 (D. Kan. 1978); see supra notes 97, 100, 106 and accompanying text (discussing Professional Investors).
190. Schlunk v. VWAG, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 608, 503 N.E.2d at 1054. The court
used this finding to dispel any analogy to a franchisee, which is independent and able to
accept or reject the franchise terms. Id. at 607-08, 503 N.E.2d at 1053-54 (distinguishing
Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill. App. 3d 716, 413 N.E.2d 457 (1980)).
191. Id. at 608, 503 N.E.2d at 1054.
192. Id. (quoting Rymal v. Ulbeco, Inc., 33 Ill. App. 3d 799, 803, 338 N.E.2d 209,
213 (1975)).
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vice by operation of law" 3 and that substituted service authorized under
the Illinois long arm statute did not violate the Hague Service
Convention. 1 "
The above discussion of the Illinois Appellate Court analysis illustrates the plethora of arguments for and against the exclusivity of the
Hague Service Convention as a means to effect service on defendants in
foreign signatory states. In contrast, on appeal, the United States Supreme Court focused solely on the scope of the Convention and held that
the Hague Service Convention does not apply to service of process on a
foreign corporation by service on its domestic subsidiary, as the foreign
corporation's involuntary agent for service under state law, when such
service is valid and complete under both state law and the due process
clause.
After discussing the purpose 95 and relevant provisions of the Hague
Service Convention, 96 the Supreme Court.9 found that article 1 defines
the scope of the Convention and in that case provided the subject of the
controversy.'" Article 1 provides, "The present Convention shall apply
in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to
transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad."' 99 The
Court declared that this language is mandatory and thus "pre-emp[ts]
inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law in all cases to
which it applies." 00 The Court set down a rule for the present case that
the service should be quashed if it were within the scope of article I of
the Convention.20 ' When the court applied this rule to the facts, it found
that the service was not within the scope of article 1; an order to quash
2
therefore was not automatically available 02
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court interpreted article 1 by ana193. Id.
194. Id. at 597, 503 N.E.2d at 1047.
195. The Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the Hague Service Convention is
to provide a simplified foreign service structure both to assure actual and timely notice to
foreign defendants and to facilitate proof of such service. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 2107 (1988).
196. The Court discussed the Central Authority provisions as providing the "primary innovation" of the Hague Service Convention. Id. at 2107-08 (discussing Hague

Service Convention, supra note 2, arts. 2, 5-6, 8-11, 15-16, 19).
197. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 2106.

198. Id. at 2108.
199.

Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, quoted in Schlunk, 108 S.Ct.

at 2108.
200. Schlunk, 108 S.Ct. at 2108 (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202, Id. at 2112.
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lyzing the text, context, history, negotiation, and practical construction of
that provision. Because the text of the Convention is silent regarding the
"occasion to transmit" documents for "service of process," the Court relied on the "well-established technical meaning" of "service of process"
which the Court defined as the "formal delivery of documents that is
legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action.

' 20 3

The Court said the negotiating history shows that "service of

process" was meant in this technical sense.G According to the Court,
because the Convention fails to provide a standard for the legal sufficiency of formal delivery, the Court "almost necessarily must refer to the
internal law of the forum state" 20 5 to formulate the controlling rule: "If
the internal law of the forum state defines the applicable method of serving process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad, then the
Hague Service Convention applies.

' 206

The Court found support for its

rule in the negotiating history of the Convention, which the Court indicated also refers to the use of the forum state's law to determine whether
there is service abroad.20 7 VWAG contended that this interpretation is
inconsistent with the purposes of the Hague Service Convention because
states could circumvent the Convention by defining methods that do not
require transmitting documents abroad. 20 ' The Court dismissed this accusation, stating, "[w]e do not think that this country, or any other country, will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to transmit judicial
20 9
documents for service abroad.

203. Id. at 2108.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2109. The Court noted that although this solution lessens the obligatory
force of the Hague Service Convention, the drafters, in the absence of an objective test,
intended the forum state law test to provide clarity. Id.
208. Id. at 2109-10.
209. Id. at 2111. The Court buttressed its belief by countering the method that
VWAG gave as an example of such circumvention practices, notification au parquet.
This method allows foreign service by deposit of service documents with a designated
local official who is not subject to any sanction for failure to transmit the documents. Yet
the statute of limitations runs from the time of delivery to the official. The Court found
that the Convention drafters clearly put an end to this method through the default judgment provisions found in articles 15 and 16. The Court, however, did not find any comparable evidence of the drafters' intentions to have the Convention apply to substituted
service on a subsidiary if service abroad clearly is not required under the forum's law.
The Court said that even articles 15 and 16 of the Convention apply only when service
documents require transmittal abroad. The Court expressly did not resolve whether the
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The Court denied that the two stated purposes of the Hague Service
Convention-(1) the creation of an appropriate means to facilitate foreign service of process; and (2) the improvement of the organization of
mutual judicial assistance by a simplification and expedition of the procedure 21 0-compel a different conclusion.2" 1 The Court agreed with
VWAG that a further purpose of the Convention is the assurance of
adequate notice in foreign service, but the Court emphasized that this
purpose, effectuated through articles 15 and 16, applies only when the
Hague Service Convention applies. 12 The Court candidly admitted that
its interpretation does not necessarily advance the adequate notice purpose of the Hague Service Convention but rather makes the forum's law
control the determination of whether the Convention's service methods-aimed at advancing this purpose-are mandatory."'
The Court's position in Schlunk resulted in a finding that the Illinois
long arm statute authorized substituted service on VWoA as an agent of
VWAG without transmitting documents to Germany. 2 4 The Court rejected VWAG's due process, notice requirement argument 21 5 that whenever service on a foreign national is involved, the service falls within the
scope of the Hague Service Convention under article 1.21" The court
held, "Where service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under
both state law and the Due Process Clause, our inquiry ends and the
Convention has no further implications. 2 1 7
The Court concluded that Schlunk did not present an occasion to

Convention applies to variants of notification au parquet that require transmittal of foreign service. Id. at 2110.
210. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
211. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2110. The Court reasoned that nothing in its decision
interferes with the Convention's requirement that each state establish a Central Authority by which the Convention implements the enabling function outlined by its purposes.

Id. at 2110.
212. Id. at 2110-11; see supra notes 37-38, 58, 138, and accompanying text (article
15 as the equivalent of the United States due process notion).

213. Schlunk, 108 S.Ct. at 2111. The concurring Justices stated that the majority
opinion fails adequately to guarantee timely notice. Id. at 2112-14 (Brennan, J., concurring) (joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). The majority in turn criticized the concurrence for denominating timely notice as the "primary purpose" of the Hague Service
Convention without any authority and for asserting a due process notion that is not in

line with the plain meaning of "service abroad." Id. at 2111 n.**.
214. Id. at 2111-12.
215. Id. at 2112 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
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transmit service abroad within article 1 of the Hague Service Convention. 18 This conclusion rendered the Convention inapplicable and the
service proper."19 The Hague Service Convention therefore applies only
when service under the forum's law necessarily requires transmittals
abroad; the due process clause does not necessarily require service abroad
every time there is service on a foreign national.22 °
The three concurring Justices 221 agreed with the majority's conclusion
that service on a foreign corporation's wholly owned domestic subsidiary
is process not within the scope of article I "service abroad" and is therefore not contrary to the Hague Service Convention. 22 They disagreed,
however, with the majority's analysis. 2 3 In essence, the concurring Justices disagreed with the majority's broad view that the forum's law conclusively determines whether required process is "service abroad" or
"domestic" service-the former requires compliance with the Hague
Service Convention whereas the latter does not 224-because they claimed
such a view deprives the Convention of any mandatory effect.2 25 Rather,
these Justices believed that the negotiating history supports an interpretation of "service abroad" that embodies a substantive standard that
"limits a forum's latitude to deem service complete domestically." 226 The

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion in which Justices Marshall and
Blackmun joined. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. The concurring Justices were not as optimistic as the majority about the
forum's reluctance to designate service as "domestic" to circumvent compliance with the
Hague Service Convention provisions. Id. at 2113-14. The concurring Justices argued:
[Hiad we been content to rely on foreign notions of fair play and substantial justice, we would have found it unnecessary, in the first place, to participate in a
Convention "to ensure that judicial ... documents to be served abroad [would] be
brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time ...."
Id. at 2117 (quoting Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, preamble).
225. Id. at 2112. The concurring Justices also specifically agreed with the prior
holding in Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States District Court,
482 U.S. 522 (1987), that the Hague Service Convention terms are mandatory with
respect to transmissions within the scope of article 1. Schlunk, 108 S.Ct. at 2112; see
supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (discussing the indication of the Court the
prior term in Agrospatiale that the Hague Service Convention terms are mandatory as to
transmissions within its scope); infra note 242 and accompanying text (discussing all
United States Supreme Court pronouncements that the Hague Service Convention is
mandatory as to transmissions within its scope).
226. Schlunk, 108 S.Ct. at 2112.
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concurring Justices focused on the first of the two stated objectives of the
Hague Service Convention which they interpreted as the promotion of
notice,227 and indicated that the negotiating history supports this construction.228 The concurring Justices criticized the majority's adherence
to its interpretation even though the majority admitted that its view
"does not necessarily advance" what the concurring Justices considered
the "primary purpose" of notice advanced by the Convention. The Justices accused the majority of abrogating its duty to read the Convention
in a way to effectuate the objects and purposes of the signatory states.22
The concurring Justices agreed with the majority that the Hague Service Convention does not provide a precise standard to distinguish between "domestic" service and "service abroad."2 30 They did not approve,
however, of the majority's holding that the forum state's internal law
determines this question.2 3 ' Rather, the concurring Justices thought the
negotiating history provides a substantive standard, namely, that of providing adequate. notice 2 2 -a due process concept. The concurring Justices recognized that this standard is problematic to apply, but they justified this difficulty with an analogy to similar complications in applying
the United States due process concept. 2 3 They agreed with the majority's conclusion on the facts because, under the adequate notice standard,
"it is remarkably easy to conclude that the Convention does not prohibit
* . * [s]ervice on a wholly owned, closely controlled subsidiary [because
such service] is reasonably calculated to reach the parent 'in due time' as
'234
the Convention requires.

227. Id. at 2113. The majority's analysis of this purpose of the Convention deemphasizes the notice provision and states that the Convention's first purpose is the creation
of an appropriate means to facilitate foreign service. The Court emphasized the outline
of the service structure, not the due process notion. See supra notes 195, 210-13 and
accompanying text.
228. The concurring Justices discussed this emphasis on notice in the travaux
pr~paratoiresprimarily through the passages in the travaux evincing dissatisfaction with
notification au parquet. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2113-16; see supra note 209.
229. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2114 (citing Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331-32
(1912); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); Wright v. Henkel, 190
U.S. 40, 57 (1903)).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2116.
233. Id.
234. Id. The concurring Justices indicated that their disagreement with the majority,
having no relevance on the outcome here, may have little practical consequences in other
cases that would come before United States courts as well because all process must comply with due process under the United States judicial system. Id. at 2116-17. Yet, the
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V.

THE EFFECT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

POSITION ON UNITED STATES INTERPRETATIONS OF THE HAGUE
SERVICE CONVENTION

The effect of the recent United States Supreme Court position developed in Agrospatialeand Schlunk depends on whether subsequent courts
read the Supreme Court's decision in Schlunk restrictively or expansively. Read restrictively, the case may be limited to its facts and constitute a statement more of agency than of the Convention's applicability.
This is the basis of agreement between the majority and the concurring
Justices; a wholly owned, highly controlled, domestic subsidiary of a foreign corporation neatly fits both the majority's emphasis on the scope of
the Convention and the emphasis of the concurring Justices on the Convention's purpose as a means to ensure that foreign defendants receive
adequate notice of suit.
Broadly speaking, in Arospatiale and Schlunk, the Supreme Court
ostensibly closes the first of the two major splits in the case law concerning the interpretation of the Hague Service Convention 3 5 by declaring
the Convention mandatory and therefore applicable to all service within
the Convention's scope.2" 6 After the Court cited Agrospatiale for its own
prior acknowledgement of the Convention's mandatory nature," 7 it declared, in Schlunk, that "[b]y virtue of the Supremacy Clause, . . . the
Convention pre-empts inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state
law in all cases to which it applies." 2 8 This declaration's explicit mention of state law is attributable to the fact that state service rules were
the rules exercised in Schlunk.2 9 That the Hague Service Convention
supersedes state service rules is well settled under the supremacy
clause.24 ° It is the authority of the Convention vis-A-vis the Federal

concurring Justices thought their position important because they found some practical
problems with the majority's holding. First, noncompliance with the Hague Service Con-

vention makes it more difficult for United States nationals to enforce judgments abroad,
Id. at 2117. And second, the defendant is equally disadvantaged by circumvention of the
Hague Service Convention regardless of whether circumvention is intentional by the forum. Id.

235. See supra part I.
236. See infra note 242 (indicating the United States Supreme Court pronounce.
ments that the Hague Service Convention is mandatory over transmissions within its
scopes).
237. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2108 (1988).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2106.
240. See supra part I, and part II, section B.2.
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Rules of Civil Procedure that is more uncertain.2 41 Ostensibly, the Court
declared the supremacy of the Convention over the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as well as over state procedural rules in its pronouncements that the Convention is mandatory in all cases within its scope. 42
Such a case would be one heard in a federal court, generally operating
under federal law, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that
requires service abroad. But the Court's explicit mention of state rules
only 243 may encourage future litigants to argue that the Court meant
that only state rules are superseded.
The Court's explicit holding in Schlunk settles the controversy in the
lower courts in favor of cases that hold the Hague Service Convention
inapplicable to service on a foreign national that is properly served
through its domestic agent under the forum's law; this holding rejects the
cases that hold the Hague Service Convention the exclusive means of
serving a foreign corporation, the forum's law notwithstanding.24 4 This
strict reliance on the forum's internal law allowed the Court to avoid
adopting one of the many formulations of the control necessary to establish agency for service of process, 24 5 leaving that determination to subsequent courts in accordance with the applicable controlling forum law. 2"
Read expansively, the Court's holding is broad, yet simple: the forum's law is controlling. If the forum's law requires the transmittal of
service documents abroad, the Hague Service Convention controls exclusively; if not, the Hague Service Convention has no application. This is
reflective of the expansive United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit holding in Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, which, as did

241. See supra part I, and part II, sections A, B.1.
242. These pronouncements appear in the majority opinion in Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534 n.15 (1987), in
the majority opinion in Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2108, and in the concurrence in Schlunk.
Id. at 2112 (Brennan, J., concurring).
243. See supra note 238-39 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
245. These formulations are presented above. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
246. At first glance, the Court seems to state, contrary to established precedent, see
supra note 98 and accompanying text, that the parent-subsidiary relationship alone is
enough to establish agency for the purpose of service because the Court does not discuss
the degree of control exercised by VWAG over VWoA. This, however, is not the case.
The lower courts already established the existence of the control necessary for agency
under Illinois law. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2106; see also supra notes 170-72, 181-94
and accompanying text. The Court apparently adopts this finding because it deems controlling the forum's internal law on the question. See supra notes 205-06, 239 and accompanying text.
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Schlunk, focused on the scope of the Convention.24 7 Other courts have
relied on due process, solely or in conjunction with the Convention, to
justify noncompliance.2 48 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit-the circuit for Illinois, through whose courts
Schlunk arose-have followed Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court in
looking to due process to circumvent the Hague Service Convention.249
The concurrence in Schlunk also focuses on due process. 250 The majority, however, ignored this rationale. Not only did the majority ignore the
notice provision in the first of the two stated purposes of the Hague
Service Convention, it also admitted that its holding does not advance
this purpose.251 The supremacy clause usually provides the primary rationale for finding that the Hague Service Convention exclusively controls foreign service.25 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, however, avoided the criticism that it ignored the
supremacy clause when it found that the Hague Service Convention was
inapplicable.2 5 3 The court held that the Hague Service Convention is the
supreme law only for its limited stated purpose of providing a method
for service independently authorized under the forum state's laws.25 4
Another potential answer to the supremacy clause criticism is the
analysis in Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, in which the
Alabama Supreme Court explored whether the service was valid before
finding a supremacy clause violation, rather than using the supremacy
clause to determine whether the service was valid.25 5
Aside from its cursory statement of the supremacy of the Convention
over state rules under the supremacy clause, the Supreme Court in
Schlunk failed to address the supremacy clause issue.256 In this way, the
Court avoided deciding whether the later in time analysis, the general
247.

See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.

248. See supra part II, section A.2.
249. Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 431 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Il. 1977),
affd, 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
250. See supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
251. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2111; see supra notes 213, 227-29 and accompanying
text.
252. See supra part II, section B.
253. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir.), cert. de-

nied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
254. Id. at 289; see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing DeJames).
255. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text. This failure could be because
the argument was not raised in the court below. The Supreme Court, however, could
have answered the supremacy clause issue sua sponte.
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versus specific analysis, or a different test altogether determines whether
the Hague Service Convention controls or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure control under the supremacy clause. 57
In addition to failing to address the due process rationale for circumventing the Hague Service Convention, or the supremacy clause arguments for and against the Hague Service Convention providing the exclusive method for service, the Schiunk majority did not rely on any
policy reasons for allowing agency findings to circumvent compliance
with the Convention.2 51 The majority, by relying solely on the Convention's scope, as revealed in article 1, and the Convention's negotiating
history, left itself open to much criticism. First, it is unclear why the
Court "almost necessarily" must refer to the internal law of the forum in
the absence of an explicit standard in the Convention to determine when
there is "service abroad" so that the Convention applies. 5 Second, although there is negotiating history supporting this conclusion, the concurrence also shows negotiating history supporting adequate notice as the
substantive standard applicable when courts seek to bypass the Convention. Third, the Court focuses on the creation of the means for foreign
service, but does not attribute to these methods their function, stated in
the Convention as the assurance of timely notice. Fourth, the majority
does not explain why the clarity gained by relying on the forum's law to
determine when the Hague Service Convention provisions apply is more
important than the advancement of the clearly stated timely notice purpose of the Convention.
Most important, by allowing the forum's law to determine when there
must be service abroad, the forum's law gains supremacy over the Hague
Service Convention under the Schlunk holding. The Court's explicit
holding concerning the mandatory nature of the Convention is undercut
by this power given the states. 260 The Court's ruling therefore may have
the opposite effect than the Court's ostensible holding. The Court explicitly closed the first gap in the case law addressed by this Note in favor of
the mandatory nature of the Convention over United States state and

257. See supra part II, section B.1.
258. Other courts rely on these policies to find valid service on domestic subsidiaries
under local procedure rules. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
260. See Note, The Hague Service Convention as Enabler:Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 20 INTER-AM. L. REv. 175, 193 (1988) (calling the Court's
contradictory language "puzzling"); Recent Development, Service of Process: Application of the Hague Service Convention in United States Courts-Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988), 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 277, 286
(1989).
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federal service rules. Yet, in effect, the Court opened the possibility of
noncompliance with the Convention even in favor of state rules of service, rules that historically courts found the Convention most clearly
superseded.2 6 '
The concurring Justices in Schlunk may be overly nationalistic in
their determination that notice, paralleling the United States due process
concept, is the "primary" purpose of the Convention. They are correct,
however, in asserting that, like the United States due process concept,
difficulty in application does not make the standard undesirable.2" 2 The
concurring Justices also correctly take the position that the majority is
too optimistic in believing service of process rules are not or will not be
formulated at least partially with the avoidance of compliance with the
Hague Service Convention in mind.2 63
The potential consequences of Schlunk are perhaps the greatest problem with the Court's holding. Bypassing the Central Authority relieves
the process server of the translation requirements that the Central Authority may impose.264 If the defendant, however, is not charged with
knowledge of the language in which the service documents are written,
due process may be violated. Circumvention of the Convention also runs
counter to the solutions that the Convention sought to provide to the
difficulties giving rise to the Convention's existence.265 Specifically, the
reciprocal inadequacy of judicial assistance between states is heightened
by circumvention.2 6
The most serious consequence of the Supreme Court's holding results
from the fact that states may object to the alternative methods of service
under the Hague Service Convention,267 including those possibly sanctioned by the forum's internal law. The most noteworthy of these alternative methods is mail service, the subject of the second split in the case

261.

See supra part II, section B.2.

262. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2116 (1988).
263. For the views of both the majority and the concurring justices on this issue, see
supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text, and supra note 224 and accompanying text,

respectively. See also Leiner, American Service of Process upon Foreign Corporations:
the Schlunk Case and Beyond, 23 J. WORLD TRADE L. 37, 41 (Feb. 1989); Note, supra
note 260, at 198.
264. See supra notes 27-28, 52-54 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text; see also Recent Development,
Volkwagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk: The Supreme Court Defines the Scope of
the Hague Service Convention, 63 TUL. L. REv. 950, 956 (1989).
266. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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law concerning interpretation of the Hague Service Convention.26 8 If the
forum's law requires service of a foreign defendant by mail, the Schlunk
Court's rule would require compliance with the Hague Service Convention because service is required on a foreign national abroad. Mandatory
compliance would render the rest of the forum's rule ineffective. Considering, however, that the existence of personal jurisdiction depends on
both sufficient minimum contacts26 9 and perfected service giving notice, 270 a plaintiff arguably fails to obtain proper service when its service
method does not comply with the forum service law but instead complies
with the Hague Service Convention. Lack of perfected service may destroy personal jurisdiction. 27 " The idea that personal jurisdiction is not
lost by forced compliance with a United States treaty under the
supremacy clause does not provide a straightforward solution to the
problem at hand.
To avoid this potential problem, forum laws and decisions could circumvent the Hague Service Convention by allowing service on the foreign defendant in away that does not require service abroad. Such a
development, however, renders the Convention a nullity for service on
the foreign defendant, and is contrary to the solution that the Hague
Service Convention provides to the myriad problems leading to its
enactment.27 2
Another significant problem with circumvention of the Hague Service
Convention provisions is the likelihood that enforcement problems may
result if the foreign state does not like the forum's method of service.273
Because the foreign state is concerned for its defendant, it will probably
object to the service and refuse enforcement of any resulting United
States court judgment. Again, the problem of reciprocal inadequacy of
judicial assistance between states survives the Hague Service Convention's attempt to cure this shortcoming of international judicial
process.27 4

268. See supra part I and part III.
269. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
270. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Ex parte
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880, 884 (Ala. 1983).
271. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 7-18, 265-66 and accompanying text.
273. Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 822, 109 Cal. Rptr.

402, 412 (1973).
274. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Because of the enforcement problem, and perhaps for other reasons,
the Supreme Court indicated in dicta in Schlunk that courts may apply
the Hague Service Convention even if compliance is not required under
the Court's forum law test.2 75 This is good advice. Not only are the Convention methods simple and certain, but there is a risk that a plaintiff
may later discover that the forum requires the transmittal of documents
for service abroad and that the plaintiff must resort after all to the
Hague Service Convention mechanism.2 78
After the Arospatiale and Schlunk opinions, two practitioners advanced an even more cautious solution calling for service both domestically under the forum's internal law and abroad under the Hague Service Convention. 7 This assumes, of course, that compliance with one
method will not abrogate compliance with the other. For example, if the
foreign state has refused mail service 278 or the method is deemed not
allowable under the Hague Service Convention regardless of an explicit
objection, 27 9 performance of mail service under the forum's statute or
rule may give rise to enforcement and other problems noted for noncomplying service,280 regardless of any service also performed under the
Hague Service Convention provisions. Conversely, full compliance with
the Hague Service Convention may present the jurisdiction problems
also noted.2 8 '
What is needed is an interpretation of the applicability of the Hague
Service Convention more like that of the concurrence in Schlunk, which
determines mandatory compliance with the Convention on a case by case
basis. This solution does not provide the clarity in application of the
Schlunk majority rule that the forum law determines whether the Convention is applicable. It does, however, allow for consideration of the
Convention's purposes in the circumstances of the case. In order to satisfy the United States due process concerns, this consideration should include not only the Convention's notice purpose emphasized in the

275. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 211 (1988).
276. Id.
277. Davies & Weinstock, The Service of Process Overseas, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 3, 1988,
at 15, col. 4.
278. See supra notes 34-35 (discussing objections allowed by states to alternative
service methods).
279. See supra part III, section A (discussing arguments that the Hague Service
Convention forbids service by mail).
280. See supra notes 264-66, 273-74 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
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Schlunk concurrence, but all the Convention's purposes to achieve the
full intent of the signatory states and to solve the problems giving rise to
the Convention. A presumption that the Convention is applicable to the
foreign defendant should aid a case by case analysis. Such a presumption
is consistent with the signatories' intentions and adds predictability to the
determination of the applicable service law. 2
This method gives courts the flexibility necessary to allow service
under domestic procedures on foreign corporations doing business in the
forum through subsidiaries. In those cases, the policies of the Convention
would not lose their integrity by the exercise of domestic service procedure. Rather, the exercise of service under the domestic rules would
merely estop a foreign corporation doing substantial business in the
United States from avoiding service merely by its choice of corporate
structure. Indeed, this method of case by case analysis, coupled with a
presumption in favor of the Convention's applicability is the best solution in light of the Court's rationale for its advice to follow the Hague
Service Convention.28 3 The Court's explicit holding that compliance is
not necessary if service abroad is not required under the forum's law
unfortunately undermines this conclusion.
Rita M. Alliss

282. The presumption also should aid compliance with the United States concept of
due process because compliance with all the Convention's terms necessitates compliance
with article 15 of the Convention, which the United States Senate and various United
States courts recognize as equivalent to the United States due process concept. See supra
notes 37-38, 58, 138 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX

CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL
AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR
COMMERCIAL MATTERS
The States signatory to the present Convention,
Desiring to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of
the addressee in sufficient time,
Desiring to improve the organisation of mutual judicial assistance for
that purpose by simplifying and expediting the procedure,
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect and have agreed
upon the following provisions:
Article 1
The present Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial
matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial
document for service abroad.
This Convention shall not apply where the address of the person to be
served with the document is not known.
CHAPTER I - JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS

Article 2
Each contracting State shall designate a Central Authority which will
undertake to receive requests for service coming from other contracting
States and to proceed in conformity with the provisions of articles 3 to 6.
Each State shall organise the Central Authority in conformity with its
own law.
Article 3
The authority or judicial officer competent under the law of the State
in which the documents originate shall forward to the Central Authority
of the State addressed a request conforming to the model annexed to the
present Convention, without any requirement of legalisation or other
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equivalent formality.
The document to be served or a copy thereof shall be annexed to the
request. The request and the document shall both be furnished in
duplicate.
Article 4
If the Central Authority considers that the request does not comply
with the provisions of the present Convention it shall promptly inform
the applicant and specify its objections to the request.
Article 5
The Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or shall arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency,
either (a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or
(b) by a particular method requested by the applicant, unless such a
method is incompatible with the law of the State addressed.
Subject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of this article, the
document may always be served by delivery to an addressee who accepts
it voluntarily.
If the document is to be served under the first paragraph above, the
Central Authority may require the document to be written in, or translated into, the official language or one of the official languages of the
State addressed.
That part of the request, in the form attached to the present Convention, which contains a summary of the document to be served, shall be
served with the document.
Article 6
The Central Authority of the State addressed or any authority which
it may have designated for that purpose, shall complete a certificate in
the form of the model annexed to the present Convention.
The certificate shall state that the document has been served and shall
include the method, the place and the date of service and the person to
whom the document was delivered. If the document has not been served,
the certificate shall set out the reasons which have prevented service.
The applicant may require that a certificate not completed by a Central Authority or by a judicial authority shall be countersigned by one of
these authorities.
The certificate shall be forwarded directly to the applicant.
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Article 7
The standard terms in the model annexed to the present Convention
shall in all cases be written either in French or in English. They may
also be written in the official language, or in one of the official languages, of the State in which the documents originate.
The corresponding blanks shall be completed either in the language of
the State addressed or in French or in English.
Article 8
Each contracting State shall be free to effect service of judicial documents upon persons abroad, without application of any compulsion, directly through its diplomatic or consular agents.
Any State may declare that it is opposed to such service within its
territory, unless the document is to be served upon a national of the State
in which the documents originate.
Article 9
Each contracting State shall be free, in addition, to use consular channels to forward documents, for the purpose of service, to those authorities
of another contracting State which are designated by the latter for this
purpose.
Each contracting State may, if exceptional circumstances so require,
use diplomatic channels for the same purpose.
Article 10
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly
to persons abroad,
(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons
of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly
through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the
State of destination,
(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to
effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers,
officials or other competent persons of the State of destination.
Article 11
The present Convention shall not prevent two or more contracting
States from agreeing to permit, for the purpose of service of judicial doc-
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uments, channels of transmission other than those provided for in the
preceding articles and, in particular, direct communication between their
respective authorities.
Article 12
The service of judicial documents coming from a contracting State
shall not give rise to any payment or reimbursement of taxes or costs for
the services rendered by the State addressed.
The applicant shall pay or reimburse the costs occasioned by (a) the employment of a judicial officer or of a person competent
under the law of the State of destination,
(b) the use of a particular method of service.
Article 13
Where a request for service complies with the terms of the present
Convention, the State addressed may refuse to comply therewith only if
it deems that compliance would infringe its sovereignty or security.
It may not refuse to comply solely on the ground that, under its internal law, it claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
action or that its internal law would not permit the action upon which
the application is based.
The Central Authority shall, in case of refusal, promptly inform the
applicant and state the reasons for the refusal.
Article 14
Difficulties which may arise in connection with the transmission of
judicial documents for service shall be settled through diplomatic
channels.
Article 15
Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present Convention, and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not
be given until it is established that (a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal
law of the State addressed for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or
(b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his
residence by another method provided for by this Convention, and that
in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend.
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Each contracting State shall be free to declare that the judge, notwithstanding the provisions of the first pargraph of the article, may give
judgment even if no certificate of service or delivery has been received, if
all the following conditions are fulfilled (a) the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for
in this Convention,
(b) a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate
by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed since the date of the
transmission of the document,
(c) no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every
reasonable effort has been made to ohtain it through the competent authorities of the State addressed.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs the judge
may order, in case of urgency, any provisional or protective measures.
Article 16
When a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present Convention, and a judgment has been entered against a defendant
who has not appeared, the judge shall have the power to relieve the
defendant from the effects of the expiration of the time for appeal from
the judgment if the following conditions are fulfilled (a) the defendant, without any fault on his part, did not have knowledge of the document in sufficient time to defend, or knowledge of the
judgment in sufficient time to appeal, and
(b) the defendant has disclosed a prima fade defence to the action on
the merits.
An application for relief may be filed only within a reasonable time
after the defendant has knowledge of the judgment.
Each contracting State may declare that the application will not be
entertained if it is filed after the expiration of a time to be stated in the
declaration, but which shall in no case be less than one year following
the date of the judgment.
This article shall not apply to judgments concerning status or capacity
of persons.
CHAPTER II - EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Article 17
Extrajudicial documents emanating from authorities and judicial officers of a contracting State may be transmitted for the purpose of service
in another contracting State by the methods and under the provisions of
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the present Convention.
CHAPTER III - GENERAL CLAUSES

Article 18
Each contracting State may designate other authorities in addition to
the Central Authority and shall determine the extent of their
competence.
The applicant shall, however, in all cases, have the right to address a
request directly to the Central Authority.
Federal States shall be free to designate more than one Central
Authority.
Article 19
To the extent that the internal law of a contracting State permits
methods of transmission, other than those provided for in the preceding
articles, of documents coming from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Convention shall not affect such provisions.
Article 20
The present Convention shall not prevent an agreement between any
two or more contracting States to dispense with (a) the necessity for duplicate copies of transmitted documents as required by the second paragraph of article 3,
(b) the language requirements of the third paragraph of article 5 and
article 7,
(c) the provisions of the fourth paragraph of article 5,
(d) the provisions of the second paragraph of article 12.
Article 21
Each contracting State shall, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession, or at a later date, inform the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands of the following (a) the designation of authorities, pursuant to articles 2 and 18,
(b) the designation of the authority competent to complete the certificate pursuant to article 6,
(c) the designation of the authority competent to receive documents
transmitted by consular channels, pursuant to article 9.
Each contracting State shall similarly inform the Ministry, where appropriate, of(a) opposition to the use of methods of transmission pursuant to arti-
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cles 8 and 10,
(b) declarations pursuant to the second paragraph of article 15 and the
third paragraph of article 16,
(c) all modifications of the above designations, oppositions and
declarations.
Article 22
Where Parties to the present Convention are also Parties to one or
both of the Conventions on civil procedure signed at The Hague on 17th
July 1905, and on 1st March 1954, this Convention shall replace as
between them articles 1 to 7 of the earlier Conventions.
Article 23
The present Convention shall not affect the application of article 23 of
the Convention on civil procedure signed at The Hague on 17th July
1905, or of article 24 of the Convention on civil procedure signed at The
Hague on 1st March 1954.
These articles shall, however, apply only if methods of communication, identical to those provided for in these Conventions, are used.
Article 24
Supplementary agreements between parties to the Conventions of
1905 and 1954 shall be considered as equally applicable to the present
Convention, unless the Parties have otherwise agreed.
Article 25
Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 22 and 24, the present
Convention shall not derogate from Conventions containing provisions on
the matters governed by this Convention to which the contracting States
are, or shall become, Parties.
Article 26
The present Convention shall be open for signature by the States represented at the Tenth Session of The Hague Conference on Private International Law.
It shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
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Article 27
The present Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after
the deposit of the third instrument of ratification referred to in the second paragraph of article 26.
The Convention shall enter into force for each signatory State which
ratifies subsequently on the sixtieth day after the deposit of its instrument of ratification.
Article 28
Any State not represented at the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law may accede to the present Convention
after it has entered into force in accordance with the first paragraph of
article 27. The instrument of accession shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
The Convention shall enter into force for such a State in the absence
of any objection from a State, which has ratified the Convention before
such deposit, notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands within a period of six months after the date on which the said
Ministry has notified it of such accession.
In the absence of any such objections, the Convention shall enter into
force for the acceding State on the first day of the month following the
expiration of the last of the periods referred to in the preceding
paragraph.
Article 29
Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that the present Convention shall extend to all the territories for
the international relations of which it is responsible, or to one or more of
them. Such a declaration shall take effect on the date of entry into force
of the Convention for the State concerned.
At any time thereafter, such extensions shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
The Convention shall enter into force for the territories mentioned in
such an extension on the sixtieth day after the notification referred to in
the preceding paragraph.
Article 30
The present Convention shall remain in force for five years from the
date of its entry into force in accordance with the first paragraph of
article 27, even for States which have ratified it or acceded to it
subsequently.
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If there has been no denunciation, it shall be renewed tacitly every five
years.
Any denunciation shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Netherlands at least six months before the end of the five year
period.
It may be limited to certain of the territories to which the Convention
applies.
The denunciation shall have effect only as regards the State which has
notified it. The Convention shall remain in force for the other contracting States.
Article 31
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands shall give notice
to the States referred to in article 26, and to the States which have acceded in accordance with article 28, of the following (a) the signatures and ratifications referred to in article 26;
(b) the date on which the present Convention enters into force in accordance with the first paragraph of article 27;
(c) the accessions referred to in article 28 and the dates on which they
take effect;
(d) the extensions referred to in article 29 and the dates on which they
take effect;
(e) the designations, oppositions and declarations referred to in article
21;
(f) the denunciations referred to in the third paragraph of article 30.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised
thereto, have signed the present Convention.
DONE at The Hague, on the 15th day of November, 1965, in the
English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic, in a
single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government
of the Netherlands, and of which a certifed copy shall be sent, through
the diplomatic channel, to each of the States represented at the Tenth
Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
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